Wilbur Ross, the U.S. billionaire who has made 65 % profit on his 2011 investment in a struggling Bank of Ireland (BOI), said he is likely to bid for banks or financial assets in Spain over the next few months.
Ross, whose WL Ross & Co. LLC owns 9.9 % of BOI, said in a telephone interview that he had spent a lot of time in Spain recently and had been impressed by banking sector reforms.
„We haven’t decided yet whether to buy assets or to invest in banks themselves, but the likelihood is that we’ll show up bidding on something in Spain,“
Ross, one of the biggest international champions of Ireland’s recovery, has made $2.6 billion through investing in poorly performing assets.
Laura Noonan – Reuters
Auch wenn manchmal der Eindruck entsteht, dass Investor-Legenden (oder sollten wir besser den Begriff Corporate Raider wählen?) wie Ross das Gras wachsen hören, führen deren sicher sorgfältigen Analysen und Einschätzungen nicht immer zum Ziel.
Im Zusammenhang mit den angedachten Investments in spanische poor performing assets muss sich erst noch herausstellen, ob sich unter dem sprichwörtlichen Gras nicht doch auch ein Minenfeld verborgen sein könnte.
Table of Contents:
In this report, Moody’s surveys the post-1960 history of sovereign bond defaults and the extent to which sovereign defaults have been accompanied by government interference with domiciled borrower’s foreign currency debt service – particularly in the form of restrictions on deposit withdrawals and moratoria on external private sector debt payments. This study constitutes Moody’s first comprehensive attempt at cataloguing and studying episodes of deposit freezes and private sector debt payments moratoria, as well as documenting local currency bond defaults.
This research combines the construction of a novel historical database with extensive case studies of past sovereign crises in order to gain a better insight into the motivation behind the use of deposit freezes and debt moratoria as tools of government interference. As the global economy has become more integrated, the nature of government interference has changed. We find that the use of deposit freezes and debt moratoria – two quintessential forms of transfer and convertibility risk – has become less frequent in recent years.
The findings of this research are broadly consistent with the key thinking behind Moody’s approach to sovereign bond ratings and country ceilings but may also call over time for marginal adjustments – something which we will study further.
I. Sovereign Bond Defaults and Restructurings
II. Sovereign Bond Defaults and Deposit Freezes
III. Bond Defaults and Moratoria on External Private Sector Debt Payments
Appendix I: Selected Deposit Freeze Events
Appendix II: Sovereign Bond Defaults and Restructurings
Appendix III: Sovereign Defaults and Deposit Freezes
Appendix IV: Moratoria on Private External Debt Servicing